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Affective Overflows in Clinical Riskwork 
 
Michael D. Fischer and Gerry McGivern 
 
Introduction 
 
The terms ‘clinical’ and ‘risk management’ are commonly associated with rational 
detachment and cold, objective calculation, emotionally removed from the subjective 
experience of dealing with sickness, injury and death.  In contrast, we suggest that 
emotion and affect are integral to the work of managing clinical risk, often involving 
the intimate handling of human subjects and their embodied subjectivities.  Dominant 
ideals of clinical risk management obscure these emotional-affective dimensions and 
what we describe below as ‘affective overflows’ in the ‘heat’ of day-to-day risk 
management (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Godin, 2004; Hirschhorn, 1999).  In day-to-day 
clinical practices emotions are materially entangled with the micro-technologies and 
devices of risk management, in its routine practices, habits and scripts (Fischer & 
Ferlie, 2013; Power, 2011).  Indeed, these practices reveal an informal and more 
‘indigenous’ practice of clinical ‘risk work’, in which risk technologies and devices 
are tactically deployed, refashioned or undermined (Fischer, 2012; McGivern & 
Ferlie, 2007; McGivern & Fischer, 2010; 2012; Nicolini et al., 2011; Waring, 2005). 
 
The interaction between people and material objects – sociomateriality - is of growing 
scholarly interest (Cetina & Bruegger, 2000; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Star & 
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Griesemer, 1989;) and regarded as an intrinsic feature of everyday working practices.  
Less attention though, has been paid to the way emotions, passions, fantasies and 
desires shape and ‘animate’ this world of material objects. For example, in his 
manifesto for relational sociology, Emirbayer (1997; 311) advocates exploring 
‘culture and collective emotions’ and notes that “the study of transpersonal emotional 
flows has remained seriously underdeveloped.” 
 
Studies of emotion within organizations generally consider intra- and inter-subjective 
emotion operating within and between individuals and groups (Fineman, 2008; 
Gabriel, 1995, 1999), often elusively (Courpasson & Thoenig, 2010; Morrill, 1995; 
Roberts et al., 2006).  However, emotions are inherently connected with desires, 
values and fantasies – and readily caught up with material objects.  These ‘affective 
intensities’ (Massumi, 2002; Thrift, 2008) confer emotional meaning and attachment 
to objects, which are ‘reworked’ as they come into and out of mental focus, 
continuously shaped and remade through changes in everyday practice.   
 
This affective dimension of risk management work has previously been suggested 
across diverse fields, including in studies of financial traders, accountants and 
auditors (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2007, 2011, 2012).  For example, Guenin-Paracini et 
al.’s (2014) ethnographic study of a large audit firm found that risk was associated 
with the emotion of fear, which shaped accountants’ thoughts and use of techniques 
during audit processes.  Similarly, Boedker and Chua’s (2013) study of a major 
corporation found that both affect and rational calculation generated energy and 
collective action as an ‘affective technology’ tied to circulating accounting practices 
and devices: 
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“A flow of emotional energy that travels in networks of technology, people, 
images… technologies are important because they distribute and circulate 
affect in action nets ... Affect flows from non-human devices to people and 
back again … its circulation via technology … act(ing) as a node in a network 
of affect production” (Boedker & Chua, 2013, pp. 262-263). 
 
From this perspective, the affective dimension of organizational life involves shared 
‘intensities’, which circulate between subjective and material ‘realities’, affecting 
subjective experience and emotions, rather than emanating from them (Navaro-
Yashin, 2012; Wetherell, 2012).  In contrast, previous empirical research (Fischer, 
2008), has found that ‘indigenous’ risk systems are more strongly imbued with 
intersubjective dynamics and meanings.  However, these (and all risk systems) have a 
dynamic tendency to acquire a public trajectory:  what begins as a latent risk 
representation may become an object of formal risk management (Castel, 1991; 
O'Malley, 2004; Power, 2007). 
 
In this chapter, we focus on clinical risk management in mental health care as an 
exemplary case of the submerged dynamics of indigenous risk systems.  
Understanding the (necessarily) more intersubjective and embodied aspects of 
extreme cases can reveal dynamics that are present, if less visible, in other contexts 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  To bring our material to the fore, we draw from an ethnography 
(Fischer, 2008) of a specialist health service for the treatment of a high risk patient 
group (people with personality disorders). 
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We suggest, firstly, that practising health care elicits a mix of positive and negative 
emotional feelings connected with handling and being accountable for the care of 
other people – their bodily experiences, transformations, illnesses and sometimes 
death.  In classic studies, such as Menzies-Lyth’s (1960) psychoanalytic study of 
nurses’ defensive mechanisms, anxiety appears as a diffuse and generalised 
explanation of these experiences.  However, this overlooks a more complex picture in 
which diverse subjective experiences are bound up with one another. 
 
Such ‘inter-subjectivity’ involves connections folded into human experience 
(Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell & Aron, 1999). Crapanzano’s (1992, 2006) describes the 
experience of intersubjectivity as an ‘interlocutory drama’ that connects us with 
others – mediating our own experiences of ourselves and others. There is “nothing 
irrational, nothing even fictive about the scene… in its experience, in its description… 
Both the scene and ... objective reality are subjectively experienced.”  (Crapanzano, 
2006, p. 398).  As this suggests, intersubjective experiences tend to be emotional 
‘dramas’ filled with expectations, meanings and desires, which are continuously 
improvised and which unfold in often surprising and unpredictable ways. Such 
dramatisation arises in many contexts involving emotional investments in the work of 
managing risk, but especially so in ‘human service organizations’ where there are 
expectations of balancing the desire for healing and care, with the wish to be 
protected from harm. 
 
Secondly, these dramas become entangled with material possessions, tools and 
artefacts.  Indeed, we argue that intersubjective experiences involve a material focus, 
involving people as well as other material objects.  Influenced by anthropology, 
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human geography and cultural theory, the scholarship on affect tends to focus on the 
so-called ‘affective intensities’ of physical objects, institutions and buildings, as 
though such objects themselves produce ‘affects’ on humans (see  Massumi, 2002; 
Thrift, 2008). However, this chapter suggests a different starting point for these 
intersubjective aspects in the context of clinical risk work. (For other intersubective 
accounts of affect, see Navaro-Yashin, 2012; Wetherell, 2012).  We argue that 
material objects do not have the ‘solidity’ they may appear to have, but are being 
continuously brought into being and shaped as part of the ‘making’ of risk.  As we 
describe below, devices and technologies that appear as background context in one 
moment can become dramatically ‘real’ in the heat of a crisis or near-miss.  Risks and 
their material representations thus reflect and ‘embody’ subjective experiences and 
projections that produce affects during incidents and crises.  
 
Finally, we argue that during dramas and crises, affective flows between indigenous 
and formal systems may become affectively ‘heated’ (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013).  As 
Callon (1998) argues, in such conditions ‘everything becomes controversial’, creating 
‘overflows’ which can escalate, producing new risk objects and eroding arrangements 
for containment through expert framing. Indigenous clinical risk work reveals 
processes of ‘organizational becoming’ (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) that are inherently 
caught up in ‘affective interactions’ between human subjects and the material objects, 
devices and technologies with which they work.  We empirically explore how 
complaints and whistleblowing affectively ‘inflame’ incidents, producing heated 
interactions that ‘overflow’ (Callon, 1998) beyond the technologies and devices 
intended to contain and manage them. 
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Overall, the chapter suggests that affective investments in the work of clinical risk 
management produce an ‘affective economy’ in which risk objects, technologies and 
devices circulate.  Whereas in ‘cool’ conditions risk management may proceed along 
intended decision pathways (Callon, 1998), when affect is added, interactions 
between relational and formal risk management systems create turbulent flows 
(Fischer, 2008, 2012), with repercussions for those invested and involved in the field.  
As the case of mental health personality disorder services discussed below shows, 
affective flows and the tendency for overflows are an intrinsic aspect of clinical risk 
and its management. 
 
Personality disorder as a risk object 
 
The healthcare context is of general interest because technical, rational-analytic 
prescribed guidelines and standardised practices are blended with traditional clinical 
judgements, a ‘felt’ sense, and an idealised empathic engagement with patients. For 
example, the ideal of ‘a good bedside manner’ has become increasingly a focus of 
medical training and professional standards. Thus there is a potentially paradoxical 
dual trajectory towards technocratic healthcare on the one hand and informed patient 
choice involving equal and empathic engagement with patients on the other. 
 
The sub-field of psychiatry is an ideal case for exploring this dual trajectory and the 
‘felt’ emotional aspects of healthcare.  In part, this is because psychiatry pays more 
attention to patients’ cognitions, emotions and subjective experiences than other 
medical sub-fields, but also because technical treatment emphasises relations and 
‘therapeutic alliances’ between patients and clinicians over pharmacological or 
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physical interventions.  Formal organizations also play a significant and visible role in 
psychiatric health care in the sense that organizational responses to clinical crises and 
risk management become the ‘front stage’ for risks which emerge from professional 
and patient communities that may be more or less attuned to the lives and experiences 
of their participants.  ‘Difficult to manage’ personality disorders provide an 
opportunity to study clinical risk management as it unfolds in the space between front 
and back stage, where emotional-affective indigenous clinical work interacts with risk 
systems but also, ultimately, with public policy issues.   
 
A number of high-profile homicides in the late 1990s, committed by people with 
mental illness, heightened public concern about the perceived risks presented by 
people with severe mental disorders.  Determined to tackle the dangers presented by 
people with such disorders, the UK government put public protection at the centre of 
its mental health policy (Department of Health & Home Office, 1999, 2000). It 
proposed legislation to allow the indefinite detention of people with severe mental 
disorders, based on presumed risk to the public. What particularly exercised UK 
government attention, were the risks presented by people with severe personality 
disorders.  While medical psychiatry often considers severe personality disorders as 
untreatable, the realization that some people with these conditions were dangerous 
brought this issue into the political spotlight. 
 
Shortly after the UK 1997 general election, Michael Stone – a convicted psychopath – 
was arrested for the double homicide of Lin Russell and her six-year old daughter, 
Megan, the previous year. Her other daughter, nine-year old Josie, had been left for 
dead with severe head injuries producing public shock and outrage. A public enquiry 
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attributed blame to severely flawed systems of risk management by mental health 
services (which had released him into the community after assessing his condition as 
untreatable) (Francis et al. 2006). 
 
While managing risk of violence or self-harm in personality disorder patients has 
been a longstanding focus in mental health and prisons, such rare but high profile 
cases of homicide in the 1990s, committed by people with either severe personality 
disorders or schizophrenia, drove the UK Government to introduce a National Service 
Framework for Mental Health.  Public protection from  ‘dangerous people’ became a 
policy priority and the new Labour government (Department of Health, 1998) 
produced a comprehensive mental health strategy covering topics ranging from 
promoting ‘healthy communities’ to ensuring the secure incarceration of people with 
severe mental illnesses, considered to be of greatest risk to others. A National Service 
Framework (Department of Health, 1999b) set out new statutory responsibilities for 
assessing and handling patients, differentiating and managing patients deemed to be at 
high risk of violence or self-harm (Home Office & Department of Health, 1999; 
National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003). 
 
A Care Programme Approach (CPA) was developed as an interagency administrative 
framework for assessing, planning, coordinating and reviewing care plans 
(Department of Health, 1999a).  The CPA specifies arrangements for 
multidisciplinary, multiagency meetings requiring crisis and contingency plans, 
handover arrangements between agencies, recording and sharing records, and 
formally reviewing plans.  These requirements are managed by named key workers – 
usually nurses or social workers – who are responsible for coordinating and 
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administering the framework. The new arrangements were overseen by statutory 
‘clinical governance’ arrangements assigned to hospital boards as an accountability 
framework for assuring systematic standards of care, transparency, reporting and care 
improvements. The boards were formally responsible for auditing their CPA 
framework on an annual basis. 
 
However, unlike patients with physical disorders, the engagement of people with 
personality disorders with a system like CPA can be difficult, even when they actively 
seek help. People with personality disorders tend to engage erratically with care 
programmes, often dropping out of treatment. High levels of emotional vulnerability 
prompt some to seek help only when they are in a state of crisis, often threatening 
suicide, or following self-harm. Although relatively few treatments for personality 
disorders have been found to be effective, an influential report (Reed, 1994) argued 
that the Democratic Therapeutic Community (DTC) model had been shown to be 
more promising than other existing models of treatment. The DTC model involves 
full-time immersion in an intensive, demanding and psychologically challenging 
programme for up to a year.  The Department of Health commissioned a national 
DTC service consisting of three communities, along with well-resourced outreach 
teams operating across district mental health services. 
 
Methods and data 
Our empirical focus in what follows is based on a four year ethnographic study 
(Fischer, 2008) of interorganizational relations between one of the DTCs and external 
agencies in health services, social care, high security hospitals and prisons.  One 
author (Fischer) had professional links to the DTCs and studied its clinical work and 
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wider engagement across three UK inner-city conurbations and a rural area. During an 
initial 2 year phase, he explored care coordination and the transition of patients 
between services. In a second phase, the empirical material concentrated on the DTC 
itself and its relations with a broader set of agencies, including national 
commissioners and the Department of Health.  Participant observations (195 hours), 
76 in-depth formal interviews (1½-2 hours in duration), and informal interviews (over 
a period of seven years) were triangulated against clinical, management and policy 
texts collated during the study. 
 
Managing risk in local mental health services 
 
In our first example, drawn from an inner-city hospital, we see various ways in which 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists attempt to prevent risk escalation by handling 
cases of personality disorder behind the scenes, drawing on emotional-relational 
techniques rather than formal organizational processes.  Practitioners’ sensitivity to 
patients’ emotions is generally regarded as a valuable tool, providing insights into 
possible reactions or escalation of problems. Handling their patients, their own 
reactions, and colleagues’ emotions is an everyday aspect of psychiatrists’ and 
clinical psychologists’ work. 
 
“I don't like working with angry, antisocial men, they freak me out. I am 
irrationally uncomfortable with them and probably just not empathic. And I 
worry about bumping into them in the street, that they will come and track me 
down ... you hear of therapists being stalked by patients. And the other thing 
which freaks me out is that they are often very charming and you just feel: 
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Jesus, I am getting sucked in here! They have done horrendous things to 
people and yet they are actually being quite nice, saying you are really 
helping me.” Clinical psychologist. 
 
“Doctors were thrashing around trying to find out what was the matter with 
me. And I was telling them but they didn't hear… All my suicide attempts were 
because nobody was listening to me, everyone got caught up in all of this self-
harm stuff and seemed to think that was more serious than the real problem, 
which they just ignored completely, even though I was desperate. It was 
making me feel even more suicidal.” Patient. 
 
As one psychiatrist describes, emotional relations can spread and quickly escalate, 
especially where there is risk of harm. 
“They create massive anxiety - my colleagues come running, terrified because 
the patient’s talking about self harm.  These patients know our anxieties; they 
know how to engage the doctor, because that doctor is scared for his 
professional life, frightened about presiding over a patient who kills 
themselves.  They test you, they will say, ‘oh doctor I feel suicidal’; and they 
look you in the eye to see how you react. I feel dead anxious too. But it means 
we always act defensively, we end up admitting them (to hospital) because we 
have to be seen to be doing something, when sometimes doing nothing or 
putting responsibility back to the patient might be the best course of action.”  
Consultant psychiatrist 1. 
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As we find in this example, emotions tend to readily flow between human subjects 
and systems of risk management, which can become articulated in various and 
contradictory ways within organizational settings. These include administrative and 
technological responses that tend towards diffusing risks (such as continuous 
observation and forcible detention of patients under mental health legislation) as well 
as clinical responses that may seek to elicit greater patient responsibility. 
 
Interactions between professionals and patients thus tend to be mediated by responses 
to actual clinical risks (first order, acting in the patient’s best interests to prevent 
harm) and systems of formal risk management (second order risks, arising from 
challenges to the risk management system). 
“Professionals get their fingers burnt because these patients challenge the 
system and get detained for their own safety.  And the whole thing becomes 
increasingly confused, because the patient fights to come out and you end up 
restricting them even more, trying to stop them from hurting themselves, 
rather than addressing any underlying psychopathology. You feel, well, I have 
taken over a very difficult patient and have ended up being backed into a 
corner, with the patient detained. And the nursing staff all divided and are up 
in arms screaming at you, and the patient seems to be deteriorating, and I am 
trapped. What do I do next? It is very, very difficult.”  Consultant psychiatrist 
2. 
Far from these formal risk management systems (including responses, such as 
physical detention or pharmacological sedation) being experienced as ‘cold’, clinical 
or organizational technologies that are external to emotional exchange, we see that 
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emotion becomes embroiled within this risk system itself, attaching itself to the 
technologies and materials of risk management. This intersubjective entanglement 
with technologies can further intensify emotional reactions and clinical risk.  For this 
reason, experienced practitioners often seek to manage personality disorder patients 
invisibly, outside of formal risk management systems.  Although not formally visible, 
handling intersubjectivity and emotional reactions through private engagement 
increases the scope for clinically embedded risk management. 
So we find professionals working in a semi-autonomous capacity, managing clinical 
relations unencumbered by formal risk management arrangements. We see such 
clinical risk work as mediating between formal and informal risk management 
systems.  Indeed, especially for many experienced clinicians, working with difficult 
patients takes place through an informal and indigenous risk system, out of sight of 
the formal risk systems, and often the wider clinical care system. As one community 
psychiatrist described it, his personal style was like a ‘warm bath’ which his patients 
tended to want to stay in for long periods. He kept in touch with one long-term patient 
who visited him (‘like an old friend’), several years after he had moved to a different 
country. More commonly, however, clinicians described striving to provide 
psychological ‘containment’ for personality disorder patients, relying more on a 
therapeutic alliance rather than interventions, and attempting to insulate them from 
the wider clinical and risk systems. 
“The service is not set up to cope with personality disorders, they end up 
being disliked and labelled as time wasters, it makes them worse and more 
entrenched.  I would never refer anyone with a personality disorder to the rest 
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of the team. Anyone who I would see as personality disorder will inevitably 
stay (just) with me.” Consultant psychiatrist 3. 
This illustrates the dynamic tension between indigenous and formal risk systems. In 
the case of personality disorders, such tensions are not exceptional incidents requiring 
an emergency response, but are part of the everyday tensions and signs of trouble that 
practitioners are vigilant about – steering between relational and formal risk 
management as part of everyday work. 
 
These tensions become particularly salient when localised trouble escalates to formal 
complaints or whistleblowing involving external parties. One medical director 
described how his staff attempted to manage a patient through a more informal out-
patient care – rather than run the risk of her repeating a pattern of escalating self-harm 
by admitting her to hospital. But this backfired as this patient attracted the attention of 
authorities: 
“(She) presented very dramatically, standing on the edge of a motorway 
bridge, blocking traffic… police helicopters out and everything… she actually 
fell from the bridge and was badly injured. The police were traumatised by it 
and released a lot of damaging information to the press… big newspaper 
headlines – a hatchet job.  No mention of the fact that she had had months as 
an inpatient, she was being managed through a seven days a week care plan, 
involved in all sorts of therapies. There were (Members of Parliament) 
involved, the authorities demanding weekly statements on what was 
happening.” Medical Director. 
As Callon (1998) suggests, the local handling of risk in complex and relationally 
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‘volatile’ cases such as this may produce ‘overflows’, shifting the focus from first 
order risks to the risk management systems. Whereas such escalation can increase 
tensions within formal (and reputational) risk management arrangements, this may be 
in direct conflict with the handling of clinical risks.  As our medical director describes 
it: 
“(Our hospital) lawyers said if we had been in the coroner's court, it would 
have been very difficult to convince a jury of peers that (treating such a high 
risk patient as an outpatient) was a sensible plan. You have to understand the 
risks of doing things that seem crazy but are in the patient’s long term 
interests.” Medical director. 
In other words risk work can produce risk as emotions run high, producing affective 
flows and overflows beyond formal risk management systems. In this sense, in the 
case of complaints and whistleblowing, the risk management system may become 
‘heated’ through this emotional economy of risk. This can create pressure to develop 
more elaborate informal and relational risk work practices to containing this ‘heating’ 
process. 
 
For instance, a multidisciplinary care team became divided over whether they should 
work with a patient who some believed posed a risk to children. Unable to resolve the 
conflict internally, their manager referred the issue to the hospital CEO:   
 
“It was really destructive and created a big split in the team. The service 
wasn’t geared up for dealing with this level of risk. We were never going to 
meet his needs but just compound his frustration and further increase his risky 
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behaviour. There was a real deadlock. Eventually it was resolved because this 
man was excellent at complaining, flagging up deficits in our service to the 
highest echelons, it made everybody really anxious. In the end, our CEO and 
the director of social services ended up having weekly (counselling) sessions 
with him. It was incredibly bizarre!”  Head of Psychology. 
While such indigenous clinical risk management work is often invisible to formal risk 
systems, it is an important aspect of clinical work. The dynamics of emotional 
entanglement between people and the risk systems and technologies produce 
unexpected flows and overflows to other parties, altering usual decision path 
dependencies. In the next section, we explore how ‘materiality’ operates as part of 
this emotional economy of risk.  
The DTC: Shifts between informal and formal riskwork systems 
 
The Democratic Therapeutic Community (DTC) system had been identified as one of 
the few successful clinical treatments for personality disorders (Reed, 1994), 
requiring an intensive re-socialisation programme involving full time residential 
treatment over a period of 12 months.  The DTC was run using a complex set of rules 
and a structured programme of groupwork designed to ‘slow incidents down’ so that 
they could be discussed and ‘worked through’ over time (often several days), before 
making decisions and taking action. 
 
Risk assessment and management were seen as the principle therapeutic task, 
requiring all current and prospective DTC members to learn to recognise and 
understand their own emotions and those of others, as a means of handling the 
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potential for risk escalation. Indeed, patients were seen as more effective and accurate 
assessors of clinical risk than clinical staff, and they generally had a strong personal 
investment in keeping the DTC ‘a safe space’. Accordingly they played a significant 
role in running the DTC (the elected ‘Top Three’ patients jointly led the day-to-day 
running of the community, together with a senior team of doctors, psychologists and 
nurses), as well as clinical decision-making, voting on who should be admitted to, or 
discharged from, the unit. 
 
The DTC’s rules were democratically determined, interpreted and occasionally 
amended, based on long-established principles of democratisation (the full 
community of patients and staff make clinical and management decisions throughout 
the day through democratic voting); communalism (all members are required to 
participate in the life of running the community, such as cleaning and preparing 
meals); permissiveness (members are expected to interact authentically and to 
‘surface’ problem issues and behaviours); and reality confrontation (members are 
expected to learn and take responsibility for the impact of their behaviour on others) 
(Rapoport, 1960).  Meetings of the full community could be called at any time of the 
day or night to manage emerging incidents or crises until the following scheduled 
community meeting. 
 
Emphasis was placed on patients identifying and managing risks within the 
community.  The DTC ran a daily timetable of small and large group activities from 
morning until late evening, which all patients and staff were expected to fully 
participate fully in as the DTC’s model of therapeutic treatment, and its core 
technology for identifying, assessing and managing clinical risk.  Outside of formal 
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group activities, members were expected to take any concern or issues to Top Three 
who, together with staff, would decide whether to call an emergency meeting of the 
full community, or to provide informal support until the next scheduled meeting.  As 
one therapist described it: 
 
“If the culture of enquiry is not carried by residents, it becomes something 
that the staff are left to do. And when questions come from staff rather than 
residents, we are accused of being too psychotherapeutic (and) making 
residents feel vulnerable and abused. The longer (this) goes on, the less 
communication takes place, and momentum builds for things to take place 
behind the scenes.”  
A major aspect of this collective risk work was the process of selecting and 
‘constructing’ risks, which often develop through a rather fragmented and accidental 
clustering of events.  For instance, a heated altercation developed during a daily 
community meeting between Simon (patient) and John (a senior therapist), triggered 
by a comment that Simon interpreted as a ‘put-down’. 
Simon explodes in anger, protesting that John’s got it in for him – he’s always 
on his case… another exchange promptly follows. Simon mutters 
(ambiguously) ‘if you think you can do that, think again.’ John, visibly flushed 
and agitated, protests that Simon’s ‘threat’ is completely unacceptable: ‘we 
don’t do that kind of thing in here, it’s not on.’ Frustrated, Simon storms out 
of the unit… feeling provoked by John and ‘sick of being controlled.’  Extract 
from fieldnotes. 
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As members tried to work out how to make sense of what John perceived as Simon’s 
‘threat’, there was uncertainty and effort in constructing this as a risk. Few had 
noticed much of the interaction between the two. Overall, the community was 
sympathetic to Simon feeling ‘picked on’ by staff. Some clinicians seemed uncertain 
as to whether Simon’s comment was intended as a threat. John looked awkwardly for 
reassurance from colleagues, and seemed even less certain about his interpretation 
after the meeting.  Perhaps he had just overreacted? Yet in a subsequent staff 
debriefing, John’s continuing emotional reaction to the exchange persuaded the staff 
team that Simon should face the consequences of his aggressive outburst.  
 
After speaking with staff, Top Three called an emergency meeting of the community 
which (after much debate) voted to technically ‘discharge’ Simon from the 
community.  However, under the community’s structured system of rules, they 
allowed him to request a temporary 24-hour ‘sleeping-in extension’ to renegotiate his 
membership of the community.  While formally suspended from the community and 
no longer permitted to vote in community meetings, a condition for renewing his 
temporary extension was his willingness to review his perceptions, behaviour and 
attitude, in the daily community meetings. Members were, in turn, required to assess 
his commitment to the community and the risks he presented to himself and others, 
and to review and vote on his extension every 24 hours.  They finally elected to re-
instate him as a community member after the maximum permitted extension of 72 
hours.  
 
Such risk reviews were conducted as part of the daily community meetings, which 
were ritualistic and formalised in tone.  Led by the ‘Top Three’ patients, the 
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proceedings followed a structured agenda, recording ‘missed groups’ (patients were 
considered to have ‘suspended themselves’ if they missed three groups), reviewing 
‘referred meetings’ (emergency meetings with patients ‘at risk’), noting rule-breaking, 
feeding back unstructured leisure time, and planning meals and cleaning rotas.  An 
elected secretary minuted the meetings in detail and then read the minutes (at length) 
in a morning community meeting the next day.  Meetings involved frequent votes for 
decision-making based upon a set protocol: a five minute open discussion, followed 
by a proposal from the chair, a call for objections, and then a vote based on a show of 
hands (both staff and patients are required to vote).  Two ‘tellers’ finally counted and 
recorded votes for, against, and abstentions. 
 
The meeting is very formal (ritualised), starting with a name-round ‘for the 
visitor’. There was a reading of the previous day’s very detailed minutes and 
notes of discussion, which seemed verbatim ... This was listened to in silence, 
with an almost religious respect ... It felt the reading was being received like a 
sacred text in a monastery.  Extract from fieldnotes. 
Although a central part of the DTC’s functioning, the content of these meetings and 
their minutes were treated as confidential and formally invisible to the wider CPA and 
clinical governance requirements. As a record of community events, rather than 
individual patient case notes, they were not shared with outside agencies. In line with 
the DTC treatment model (as a group-based model in which there is no individual 
therapy) staff did not record separate case notes of clinical care. 
Importantly, however, this approach to assessing, planning and reviewing care was 
translated into how the DTC contributed to its formal CPA requirements. When 
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producing written reports for outside agencies, patients were involved in assessing 
each other’s risk, determining their future care needs, and (usually, but not always 
with a clinical staff member) providing written accounts of their treatment.  The DTC 
insisted upon patients attending their interagency CPA meetings to contribute to the 
assessment, planning and review process.  Often to the surprise of other agencies 
(who tend to treat the CPA as an administrative exercise), DTC patients also brought 
along one or more other patients with the intention of supporting them. 
“The client wrote her own assessment report, saying she was just about to 
leave and how well she’d done. We don't know what goes on because the DTC 
gives you very little information. And so the client comes to the CPA meeting 
with this report and her agenda. I am like, WHAT? Clients don't have agendas 
- we tell them! So that’s all been quite threatening for some staff, especially 
the psychiatrists. And we’ve had to walk a real tightrope with this client, 
trying to explain you can’t just walk in and demand all these things from 
services, because when you do, they just cut you off.” Social work manager. 
The DTC’s collective methods for identifying and creating risk objects can be seen as 
an elaborate and embedded ‘indigenous system’ of clinical risk work that is strongly 
based on relational forms of risk management. Whereas not all risks were necessarily 
brought into the DTC’s community meetings (incidents take place in private, in the 
evenings and sometimes outside of the community) this system was designed to be 
responsive and “concertina-like” in bringing clinical riskwork closer to the underlying 
uncertainty and flux of possible and actual incidents in patients’ everyday lives.  For 
example, a request to Top Three for ‘floors and doors’ would result in a rota of 
patients sleeping on the floor or remaining awake outside the bedroom of a patient 
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feeling vulnerable, to provide active support through the night.  In keeping with this 
indigenous system, the textual representations of these risks was recorded and recited 
as confidential community minutes that remained invisible to, and unaudited by, 
formal risk management procedures. 
 
Affective overflows into the policy domain 
 
A critical incident produced a significant change in the way the DTC and its hospital 
board handled clinical risks.  A former DTC patient murdered his partner, several 
weeks after being discharged from the community. Health authorities reacted by 
instigating a ‘root and branch’ comprehensive risk assessment of the entire service to 
bring the DTC ‘in line’ with the working of other psychiatric units. The hospital board 
commissioned specialists in forensic psychiatry to conduct an inquiry, emphasising 
actuarial (statistics-based) models of risk prediction, rather than the DTC’s model of 
clinical judgement. New formal risk management arrangements required regular staff 
audits and upward reporting of risks, such as ‘ligature points’ (physical features that 
could provide a noose for strangulation). Arrangements included formally recording 
and reporting discussions with patients, including ‘advice on clinical risks’ and 
discharge planning. Hospital managers challenged the idea of patients’ equal 
participation in the CPA process, insisting that clinical authority should override 
patient opinion. 
 
The introduction of these new formal risk arrangements heightened DTC members’ 
emotional reactions (of bereavement, guilt and self-blame) to the homicide, and added 
to anxiety about what some staff perceived to be a ‘witch hunt’ as they “(waited) for 
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the finger of blame to be pointed.” However, they also disrupted the DTC’s 
indigenous risk management system, as staff adopted a more procedural mindset.  
Patients perceived this as a betrayal of the DTC’s democratic methods. 
 
A key change was the manner in which risks were identified and materially 
represented within the DTC, shifting from open and exploratory practices of ‘slowing 
things down’ to a more ‘heated’ process of rapidly identifying and formally reporting 
risks.  For example, widespread drug and alcohol use within the DTC was discovered 
one night after a violent disturbance (a patient “lost it” and started throwing 
furniture), to which police were called. Anxious to reassert clinical authority, the DTC 
clinical team immediately discharged several patients who they believed to be directly 
responsible, and insisted that remaining patients formally consent to random drug and 
alcohol testing by local police. During the morning’s community meeting, DTC 
leaders introduced hospital consent forms that they handed to patients, passing them 
between each other in silence. A few patients ran from the room in tears. Most of 
those remaining signed the forms, reluctantly consenting to the police taking random 
samples of their saliva, urine, blood and hair at any time of day or night. 
 
I’m struck by the seemingly draconian and legalistic consent form ... The 
clinical director is taking advice from the drugs liaison police. Afterwards, 
junior staff disagree about the new arrangements: ‘we are far too reactive, we 
really undermine the residents… constantly checking up on them and it’s 
really not helping’ ... But DTC leaders insist their decision is not going to be 
reversed. Extract from fieldnotes 
Staff feelings of anger, resentment and betrayal by increasingly ‘untrustworthy’ 
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patients were integral to the way that these risks were perceived and constructed.  
Amongst patients, these new arrangements were experienced not as neutral 
‘technologies’ (Miller & Rose, 2008) but as emotionally and morally laden, and with 
a perceived wish to blame and punish. 
 
Instead of community meetings operating as a ‘safe space’ for surfacing and 
exploring emerging risks, they became points of tension between formal and informal 
risk systems. 
 
“It’s like a prison stand-off… trying to psyche each other out. Who’s going to 
break first? Who’s going to be able to stay silent the longest? The most 
powerful people are the ones who say nothing.” Patient. 
During a routine community meeting ‘visited’ by senior managers, for instance, they 
suspected that two patients were in a sexual relationship, which was discouraged, 
rather than prohibited according to DTC rules.  Afterwards the senior managers 
insisted that the clinical director should stop their relationship, if necessary by 
threatening the pair with immediate discharge. 
“We said to the clinical director: look, you need to do something to stop it. 
These people should be concentrating on their therapy… A lot of work had to 
go on from here to say have you counselled those individuals, have you 
recorded that you have counselled (them), and have you advised the different 
agencies.” Hospital manager. 
With escalating disturbance developing ‘behind the scenes’ amongst patients and in 
confrontations with staff, clinical identification and upwards reporting of risk 
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(through daily risk reports) produced an increasingly ‘heated’ sense of conflict – with 
the unintended perverse consequence of increasing substantive (first order) and 
constructed (second order) risks. 
“There is not one community here - there are two. I really don’t trust staff. 
You can’t call it a community when you can’t talk with them about 
anything…you can’t call it democratic.” Patient. 
“The past months have been hell …a complete lack of trust … There was no 
protected time, no retreat ... it’s like a year in Beirut.” Patient. 
An important dimension of risk escalation within and beyond the DTC is its 
repercussions within the clinical setting. The dynamics of overflow were significant 
beyond the setting, in terms of reshaping wider perceptions of risk and especially 
notions of what constitutes the relevant risk object to be managed.  However, these 
perceptions and reactions also shaped how clinical risk was managed internally and, 
as we have seen, how clinicians and managers orientated themselves to handling an 
increasing range of circulating risk objects.  As one senior manager commented, this 
sense of progressively tense risk negotiations between patients, clinicians and 
managers tended to reinforce the confusion and ‘heat’ in the risk management system. 
 
“I deliberately don’t get close to operational delivery.  You can see other… 
directors getting pulled in and you can see how all-consuming it is.  So I have 
tried to keep a bit of a distance so I can try to help them think logically.  
There’s been an awful lot of emotion for them. It is really like being in a total 
institution - you give your whole life to that service.”  Hospital manager. 
 
26 
 
Indeed, such tensions were further fueled by the DTC senior managers’ sensitivity to 
wider reactions as uncertainty about the risk management arrangements caught the 
attention of the national commissioners who “didn’t understand the model, acted 
highly emotionally (and) upped the ante even more… It makes the Board anxious, it 
really does” (senior executive).  As one official commented, the DTC was perceived 
as “poisonous . . . the atmosphere is so intense that people just get fried up. I have 
never…faced that degree of hostility. It is the only organization that (the national 
commissioners) agreed never to meet single-handed” (senior official).  
 
Although such wider reactions are important and interesting in illustrating the 
dynamics of overflow in risk management systems, the most salient aspect for our 
analysis were their local effects upon the DTC, in particular the amplification of 
perceived threats arising from second order risk management. Officials lost 
confidence in the service, and ultimately closed all three units (even though they had 
received a positive, independent evaluation, (Fiander et al., 2004)).  Significant 
factors in  this closure process were the affective tensions that were mobilised within 
and beyond the DTC and expressed in its system of clinical risk management. 
 
“I’m astounded at the failure…to support the place. We end up with the 
service collapsing because it did was what it was asked to do…politically, 
there were some ‘shenanigans’ went on and the thing collapsed. There is a 
serious underestimation of the dynamics of these (interorganizational) 
relationships and how they work” Senior official.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
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The cases of the hospital setting and the DTC environment analysed in this chapter 
point to how affective components of clinical risk work may be influenced by 
intersubjective relations within ‘ordinary’ clinical practice. We suggest that this is an 
under-explored area that may rebalance previous studies of emotional reactions 
evoked through formal risk management systems (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013; McGivern 
& Fischer, 2012).  Furthermore, future studies should take a ‘sociomaterial turn’ in 
order to understand these ‘back stage’ dynamics of clinical risk management, as an 
important yet under-explored aspect of risk management technologies.  In conclusion, 
we suggest three implications for the future analysis of the routines and ‘facticity’ 
(Power et al., 2009) of everyday risk management and its inherently emotion-laden 
character. 
 
The intersubjective dynamics of affective flow in everyday clinical work. 
 
Firstly, the cases in this chapter show how the intersubjective dynamics and tensions 
of staff-patient relations necessarily bring affect and risk together.  Patients and staff 
attempt to engage but often end up talking past each other: staff “got caught up in all 
of this self harm stuff and seemed to think that was more serious than the real 
(clinical) problem”.  Indeed, staff tend to be strongly affected by this interrelationship, 
producing a sense of affective contagion. Their perceptions of possible or actual 
danger connect interpersonal tensions and reactions within the clinical interaction, 
with implied or actual threat of risk technologies being (potentially) invoked. In this 
sense, staff experience being ‘made to feel’ tensions that are both intersubjective in 
relation to particular patients yet simultaneously relate to the risk management 
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systems.  This suggests that formal risk technologies are not somehow separate from, 
but intrinsically bound up with these staff-patient interactions, and embedded in 
routine clinical assessment, treatment, and rehabilitation.  Clinical risk is thus 
constructed and experienced as threatening and potentially overwhelming.   
 
Invoking and using risk technologies is affectively & morally laden, entailing local 
material effects. 
 
Secondly, the DTC case reveals how texts, devices and material technologies are an 
essential part of the community interaction. These are powerfully brought into play as 
part of the risk management process, increasing forms of relational control 
(sometimes referred to in clinical settings as ‘relational security’), and shifting power 
dynamics in ways that may exacerbate tensions.  They may function as part of a self-
regulating system creating potential ‘cooling’ and regulating effects, or possibly 
produce ‘heating’ dynamics that exacerbate tensions (Fischer, 2012).  Our point is 
that these risk technologies are brought into play as already affectively laden with 
institutional and clinical meanings, and which acquire further meanings and influence 
as particular relationships develop. 
 
For example, our analysis of Simon’s ‘threatening behaviour’ in the DTC, reveals an 
emergent process of risk identification within micro-level interactions. Whereas the 
DTC’s perception of actual risk was initially hesitant and uncertain, it was shaped and 
transformed through a sequence of staff and community meetings and voting rules - a 
core DTC method for assessing and discussing risk management.  As risk 
identification technologies, these initial meetings and procedures strengthened the 
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idea of risk within the clinical interaction, helping to fuel emotional reactions and the 
perception of Simon as presenting a risk of harm.  Once this risk object was 
collectively formed, the DTC then proceeded to treat it according to the well-
established rules of the formal risk management system. 
 
This collective production of risk objects involves individual patients being actively 
constructed as risky or at risk.  In the case of Simon, the patient reaction and 
resistance/defiance added further weight to the collective emerging sense of threat, 
which was seen as justifying the risk management response, even when some staff 
doubted the accuracy of the original assessment.  So we suggest that, whereas risk 
management may be designed to cool problems, its effects in practice may be to 
increase a sense of threat, fear and blame, potentially increasing tensions within the 
specific setting. 
 
These insights from the DTC setting are consistent with Douglas’s (1992) broader 
thesis that risk is tied to emotions, affect and moral values, with associated 
dimensions of fault and blame acting as rhetorical resources.  She shows how risks are 
selected by groups and evaluated in terms of their potential consequences as political, 
aesthetic and moral matters.  Indeed, we have empirically shown how, in a range of 
different clinical contexts, how participants fear the operations and effects of risk 
technologies often more than actual risks (McGivern & Ferlie, 2007; McGivern & 
Fischer, 2010; 2012).  These risk technologies may thus produce the unintended 
consequence of motivating clinicians to cover up issues connected to actual clinical 
risk because they are anxious about being blamed and scapegoated.    
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How affect overflows through risk management systems - the container becomes the 
uncontained 
 
Finally, in this chapter we have shown that, when ‘heated’, intersubjective emotions 
affect and can overwhelm risk management systems designed to contain them, 
producing escalation and overflows. Following Callon (1998) we suggested that such 
systems can become the conduit for escalation as risk moves beyond the original 
settings, increasing the difficulties of containment.  We also found that heated 
interpersonal conflicts arising between medical professionals (McGivern & Ferlie, 
2007) or between patients and clinicians (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013a; McGivern & 
Fischer, 2012) may lead them to construct cases of clinical risk which then escalate to 
become a source of further risk.  In this sense, risk objects shift beyond patients as 
staff, managers, and risk technologies themselves become the objects of risk; this 
process has a dynamic fluidity that influences and shapes the ‘solidity’ of risk devices 
and technologies.  Mundane processes, devices and inscriptions shift meanings and 
uses, reshaping experiences and perceptions of organizational dynamics beyond the 
original sites of risk.  As we have described in the case of the DTC, affective 
overflows in riskwork may at times overwhelm managerial and policy arrangements 
for risk management, resulting in the decline and even collapse of clinical services. 
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